The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has presented an ambitious proposal to amend the disclosure rules on executive and director compensation (Item 402 of Regulation S-K). If approved, it would represent the most profound reform in this area since 2006, marking a historic shift from a rigid and prescriptive approach to one based on principles and focused exclusively on materiality for the investor.
The regulator's aim is to reduce bureaucratic burden and prevent an excess of technical data from overshadowing truly relevant information for investment decision-making.
Reduction of the scope of executives subject to disclosure
One of the most significant changes is the restriction of the definition of "named executive officers" (NEOs). Until now, listed companies had to detail the compensation of at least five top executives. With the new proposal, the obligation will be limited only to the chief executive officer (CEO or equivalent) and the chief financial officer (CFO).
Although companies may voluntarily include other members of senior management, they will be required to apply the full breakdown. Furthermore, this reduction will not alter the existing tax deductibility limitations in the United States, which will continue to affect the three highest-paid executives aside from the CEO and CFO.
Three new tables to clarify the compensation cycle
The reform eliminates the current Summary Compensation Table and other complex tables—such as those for pension benefits or deferred compensation—to replace them with a more intuitive system structured into three new tables:
- Accrued Compensation Table: will reflect the compensation actually received over the last three fiscal years, including salary, annual bonuses, consolidated shares, and exercised options.
- Granted Compensation Table: will show the compensation opportunity granted in each fiscal year, valuing stock incentives at their target fair value on the grant date.
- Stock Incentives Status Table: will serve as a bridge between the two previous tables, allowing investors to track the entire lifecycle of each incentive until its consolidation, exercise, or expiration.
Simplification of metrics and higher threshold for perks
The text also proposes to ease requirements stemming from the Dodd-Frank Act. The "pay versus performance" report is simplified, reducing the historical period from five to three years and limiting the comparative metric to total shareholder return (TSR). Similarly, the calculation of the pay gap relative to the average employee is relaxed, and the requirement to quantify hypothetical severance or change of control payments is eliminated, only requiring a description of their material terms.
Finally, the threshold for reporting perks (perquisites) is drastically raised from $10,000 to $150,000, excluding minor items.
Implications for boards and next steps
The proposal now opens a 60-day public consultation period and will not affect the 2027 meeting season. However, it poses a strategic challenge for nomination and compensation committees: as narrative flexibility increases, boards will need to more rigorously justify what information they consider material and maintain an ongoing dialogue with institutional investors and voting advisors, who may continue to demand certain disclosures even if they are no longer mandatory.