Developed markets are increasingly resembling emerging ones

After the outbreak of the Iran war, Germany behaved in the markets like an emerging country. In March, it recorded more sessions with simultaneous declines in stocks, bonds, and currency than any other country analysed, including emerging ones, while the United States was among the least affected.
Mercados emergentes
International Markets

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Alex Kozhemiakin

As a guide for those allocating assets, the term “emerging markets” is catchy but imperfect. It was coined by the International Finance Corporation in 1981 to replace the expression “Third World,” which is laden with connotations, and in these 45 years it has served its marketing function. However, it leaves fundamental questions unanswered. Does it refer to emerging markets or emerging countries? Should a country be on the rise to enter the category, as the word “emerging” suggests? Once it has emerged, does it reach a stable equilibrium? If not, what happens to those that regress? And, above all, the label hides a premise. If some countries are emerging, it means that others have already arrived and that developed markets are, by extension, safe.

Assets with an asterisk

We prefer another definition. Emerging markets are assets linked to the economies of risky countries, assets with an asterisk that reminds of the presence of country risk. This definition captures a duality that the label conceals. When we invest in emerging debt, we invest in fixed income and its major risk factors (global interest rates, credit spreads, and the US dollar), which together explain a large part of the returns of this asset class.

But emerging debt is also tied to risky countries, and therein lies its differential characteristic. Country risk permeates all its issuers, adds volatility, and offers a premium to investors capable of analysing it. The same duality exists in equities. A large Latin American e-commerce company, for example, operates like any other online sales platform. If we consider it an emerging stock, it is because it operates in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.

Country risk is not unidimensional. It encompasses sovereign credit, politics, geopolitics, and structural economic fragility. Therefore, emerging markets form a heterogeneous universe that covers almost the entire credit spectrum, numerous regions, very different economic structures, and markets that range from deep and liquid to barely tradable. The label equalises everything. The asterisk preserves the nuances.

However, the greatest advantage of replacing “emerging markets” with country risk is what changes in our idea of "developed markets." The dichotomy between emerging and developed lulls investors into the belief that developed countries have reached a stable plateau from which they cannot fall. Thinking instead in terms of a continuous scale of country risk forces one to accept that any country can become more or less risky over time.

Country risk is readily apparent

Defining country risk precisely is not easy, as it can arise from various sources, with variable correlations between them. And yet, when it appears, it is clear, because it simultaneously affects all assets of the country. Its hallmark is the simultaneous fall of the main asset classes. When a crisis-prone country loses investors' confidence, its bonds, stocks, and currency fall in unison. Any veteran of emerging debt has seen this pattern repeat time and again, from Argentina to Turkey.

How to count country risk

Country risk can be counted. We call a triple decline day the session in which the main stock index of a country falls, the yield on its 10-year sovereign bond rises, and its currency weakens against the US dollar. ¹

The more triple decline days a country registers, the more its markets respond to a common national factor rather than to the independent forces that typically move stocks, bonds, and currencies.

The count of triple decline days for OECD countries over the two decades leading up to 2025 yields a very revealing ranking. The United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany recorded the fewest; Turkey, Mexico, Colombia, and Poland, the most, followed by Italy. Greece, Portugal, and Spain, historically among the most vulnerable sovereigns on the periphery of the eurozone, which were once grouped under the pejorative acronym “PIGS,” recorded more triple decline days than Chile or the Czech Republic. Outside the OECD, Brazil and Indonesia would be at the higher end of that range.

However, two caveats are worth noting. China has recorded relatively few triple decline days, but maintains capital controls that neutralise the currency component of the signal. And in eurozone countries, where the currency is common, the indicator underestimates the tension inherent to home countries, for example, that of France compared to Germany.

The ranking is a snapshot; the more interesting perspective is to see how it evolves. Take the case of the United Kingdom. Its five worst years of the last two decades, measured by triple decline days, are those from 2021 to 2025, peaking in 2022, when doubts about its fiscal credibility coincided with concerns about inflation during Liz Truss's brief tenure. In 2022, 2024, and 2025, the United Kingdom accumulated more triple decline days than the annual average of Portugal, Spain, South Korea, Hungary, or Greece in those 20 years. It is true that during those years both global and internal shocks weighed heavily. But British markets behaved as a single national bet, just the type of risk that investors take for granted in a “developed” country.

The test of the Iran war

The energy shock that followed the outbreak of the Iran war in March 2026 offers a clearer test. One would expect more triple decline days in emerging markets than in developed ones. However, that month European developed markets matched or surpassed emerging ones. Germany recorded the highest figure in our entire sample, while the United States recorded one of the lowest.

The most likely explanation is that country risk has multiple facets and the one that mattered then was national energy security. Germany, very vulnerable to external energy shocks, topped the list. The United States, almost energy self-sufficient, ranked among the lowest.

Developed markets behaving like emerging ones

The data reveal a second pattern, more relevant in the long term. In all developed markets in the sample except Italy, Spain, and Portugal, March 2026 was more extreme relative to its 20-year average than to its 10-year average. In those three countries, and in emerging markets, it was not so. The reason is that triple decline days have increased in developed markets over the last decade, while they have remained stable or decreased in emerging ones.

To understand why country risk is increasing in developed markets, it is worth analysing their main factors more closely.

•        Sovereign credit risk, the ability and willingness to pay

•        Political risk, the stability and quality of national institutions

•        Geopolitical risk, exposure to conflicts and changes in alliances

•        Structural economic vulnerability, energy dependence and exposure to supply chains

All four are causes for concern and in all of them the deterioration crosses the boundary between emerging and developed.

Regarding sovereign credit risk, public debt in developed countries skyrocketed during the pandemic, and that upward trend has not reversed. In the last year, the United States and the eurozone, along with China, accounted for nearly three-quarters of the increase in global debt. With higher interest rates, the cost of servicing that debt has grown faster than the debt itself.

On the political front, while income inequality between countries has decreased, within each country it is high and, in several major economies, such as the United States, it has increased in recent decades. At the same time, major independent observers of democratic quality (Freedom House, the V-Dem Institute, and the Economist Intelligence Unit) have documented a sustained global decline, with weaker institutions, deteriorating electoral processes, and restrictions on the media and political opposition. This democratic backslide has affected both emerging and developed countries equally.

On the geopolitical front, the transition from the liberal unipolarity of the decades following the Cold War to a more multipolar order has already been accompanied by an increase in military conflicts. A convincing theory from the realist school of international relations predicts that this trend will continue because conflict thrives in uncertainty. In a fragmented world, it is easier to err in calibrating power, intentions, and commitments.

Finally, structurally, the energy shock of 2026, like the supply chain disruptions of 2021 and 2022, highlighted supply vulnerabilities that developed economies had overlooked. In other words, supply is less elastic than in the previous era of hyper-globalisation. ²

Country risk matters more than ever

All this reinforces the need to diversify by countries in asset allocation and the importance of country risk analysis in investment processes. The logic is simple. If country risk is increasing where it has historically been lower, we believe that portfolios have more room for assets from countries where it has traditionally been higher. Diversifying across countries is the best hedge against a national factor.

For US investors in particular, this clashes with a deeply ingrained habit. Most institutional portfolios in the country show a marked domestic bias. Historically, that bias has been rewarded. The question is whether the conditions that made it possible still exist.

There remains one final consideration, specific to emerging debt. If the goal is to diversify by countries, emerging debt should accompany emerging equity in the portfolio, because both strategies are largely exposed to different countries. The main emerging equity index, the MSCI Emerging Markets, is dominated by a handful of North Asian economies. Taiwan, South Korea, and China account for 70% of its weight. Anyone investing in that index and assuming they have covered the emerging box has only “diversified” on paper. In contrast, the main index of emerging sovereign debt (J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Diversified) covers around 70 countries with limited weights, and the local currency index (J.P. Morgan GBI-EM Global Diversified) covers about 20. Both barely overlap with the large weights of equities. 

The term “emerging markets” invites investors to classify the world into two boxes. Country risk, to be measured in what point of the scale each country sits and where it is moving. The first approach was suitable when the developed world was more stable than today, but the data now demand the second.

Notes

¹ In the case of the United States, the currency component is measured against a broad basket of other currencies.

² Peter R. Orszag, Eric Van Nostrand, Noah Barbieri, and Layla McDermott, “The New Supply-Side Era: The O-Ring Meets Geopolitics” (Lazard, September 2026).

Alex Kozhemiakin
Alex Kozhemiakin
Codirector de deuda de mercados emergentes de Lazard Asset Management

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